


## DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



U-31,091/DC-3A

1 5 MAY 1984

T0:

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of Legislative Liaison

Liaison Division

Washington, D.C. 20505

SUBJECT:

Review of Unclassified Statement

Reference:

Congressional Tasking (enclosure 1).

- 1. DIA was tasked to develop a response to a Congressional inquiry and coordinate it within the Intelligence Community. Per conversation between the DIA and CIA Congressional Liaison offices, you were identified as the CIA POC on this matter. If the proposed response (enclosure 2) is acceptable to CIA, request your concurrence. If there are security sensitivities not adequately considered in this proposal, your recommendations for specific changes would be most helpful.
- 2. This response is also being coordinated with the IC Staff and NSA.

3.	We wou	11d apprecia 697-5283,	te your or Grey	comment 3285 is	s by 17 the DIA P	May OC on	1984. this ma	tter.
FOR	THE DIR	RECTOR:						
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to a group of approximately 60 members of the House of Representatives on to a group of approximately 60 members of the House of Representatives on 27 March 1984, Representative Nancy Johnson (R CT) asked several questions concerning the extent and frequency of U.S. satellite reconnaissance coverage of the Soviet Union and the ensuing U.S. analytical problems. Representative Johnson then stated that numerous constituents in her district alledge that, because of omnipresent, detailed U. satellite collection, U.S. Intelligence is omniscient, and the U.S. should therefore be free to enter into virtually any arms control agreement with the Soviets. She requested that DIA provide an unclassified statement on U.S. collection capability and the actual situation—that U.S. Intelligence has imperfect knowledge of the Soviet Union—for her to use when speaking to these constituents.

2. Develop a statement as requested by Representative Johnson, coordinating with othe Intelligence Community agencies as necessary. Statement should <u>not</u> be addressed to Representative Johnson; once developed, it should be equally useful and available to other members of Congress. After statement is coordinated within the Intelligence Conmunity by DC, DI-3 will obtain clearance from OSD/Public Affairs Security Review.

End



The United States possesses a wide range of intelligence resources which are used to monitor foreign military developments. The phrase "national technical means," often used in the context of arms control verification, includes such collection capabilities as photo reconnaissance satellites and seismic detection systems used for monitoring compliance with agreements on strategic arms limitation and underground nuclear testing. Human sources and various listening posts which monitor some foreign communications also contribute to the continuous appraisal of activities related to arms control.

A tightly controlled society such as the Soviet Union which deliberately attempts to deny information perceived to be useful to its adversaries makes it more difficult to obtain information which relates to arms control. The verification of an Arms Control Treaty is in part a function of the specific provisions in that treaty. Some treaties, such as the Antartica Treaty of 1959 which allows on-site inspection in an isolated area of the world, are readily verifiable. Others, such as the ban on biological weapons (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972) are more difficult to verify because such activities are relatively easy to hide in a closed society. Arms control agreements of the future are likely to be even more difficult to verify if they contain detailed technical provisions, such as limits on the number of warheads or missiles The quality of the pictures taken by U.S. rather than launchers. satellites is very good but Soviet activities conducted under cover of darkness or concealment, for example, compound the collection problem.

Although U.S. intelligence resources make an immense contribution to the security of all nations, they do not provide total insight into foreign activities which would permit the U.S. to enter into virtually any arms control agreement. A carefully considered match between technical provisions of proposed agreements and the U.S. national technical means to monitor such provisions is essential to U.S. policy judgments on verification.